

THE NEED FOR A REGIONAL DEFENSE FORCE
IN THE COMMONWEALTH CARIBBEAN

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Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

THESIS ABSTRACT

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The document also studies the threat to the region in the areas of economics, politics, narcotics, and external operations. The current security posture is examined, showing the weaknesses and the need for a Regional Defense Force to counter the threats outlined.

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Finally, the study looks at a possible scenario where Guatamala invades Belize and the mobilization, deployment, fight and demobilization of the Regional Force.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

| | |
|---------|-----------------------------------|
| A COY | Alpha Company |
| AF | Air Force |
| AI | Air Interdiction |
| B COY | Bravo Company |
| BN HQ | Battalion Headquarters |
| BN CDR | Battalion Commander |
| BN XO | Battalion Executive Officer |
| C COY | Charlie Company |
| C-1 | Personnel Staff Officer (CDF) |
| C-2 | Intelligence Staff Officer (CDF) |
| C-3 | Operation Staff Officer (CDF) |
| C-4 | Logistics Staff Office (CDF) |
| C-5 | Civilian/Military Staff Officer |
| CARICOM | Caribbean Common Market |
| CARIFTA | Caribbean Free Trade Association |
| CAS | Close Air Support |
| CBI | Caribbean Basin Initiative |
| CC | Chief Clerk |
| CDF | Caribbean Defense Force |
| CGSC | Command and General Staff College |
| COMD GP | Command Group |
| COMMS | Communications |
| COS | Chief of Staff |
| CPF | Caribbean Peace Keeping Force |
| CS | Combat Support |

| | |
|---------|--|
| CSS | Combat Service Support |
| DEP CDR | Deputy Commander |
| E | Engineer |
| FS | Fire Support |
| FSB | Forward Support Battalion |
| HHC | Headquarters, Headquarters Company |
| HMMWV | Highly Mobile Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle |
| HQ CO | Headquarters Company |
| HQ | Headquarters |
| IMF | International Monetary Fund |
| INT | Intelligence |
| IS | Internal Security |
| JDF | Jamaica Defense Force |
| LT | Light |
| M COOK | Master Cook |
| MED | Medical |
| MEU | Marine Expeditionary Unit |
| MI | Military Intelligence |
| MP | Military Police |
| MSSG | Marine Service Support Group |
| MTO | Motor Transport Officer |
| MTTs | Mobile Training Teams |
| NCA | National Command Authority |
| NS | Naval Support |
| OFFRS | Officers |
| RECON | Reconnaissance |
| RQMS | Regimental Quarter Master Sergeant |
| RSM | Regimental Sergeant Major |
| RSS | Regional Security System |
| S1 | Personnel Staff Officer (BN) |

| | |
|-----|---------------------------------|
| S2 | Intelligence Staff Officer (BN) |
| S3 | Operations Staff Officer (BN) |
| S4 | Logistics Staff Officer (BN) |
| SAW | Squad Automatic Weapon |
| SIG | Signals |
| SOC | Special Operation Capable |
| SOF | Special Operation Force |
| T | Tons |
| TBD | To Be Determined |
| TRL | Trailer |
| UN | United Nations |
| US | United States |
| USA | United States of America |
| WHL | Wheeled |

CHAPTER 1
A HISTORY OF THE CARIBBEAN

Introduction

The Commonwealth Caribbean region is made up of countries stretching from Belize on the mainland of Central America through the Greater and Lesser Antilles of the Caribbean Sea. They all have one thing in common: a heritage of once being a colony of the United Kingdom. The region is made up of 26 independent countries with approximately 35 million people.¹ The cultures of the different countries are diverse and the population, although predominantly of African heritage, is made up of many races.

Because of the British influence and the fact that Britain had responsibility for their defense during the colonial era, the armed forces of the region never really developed. However, during the two world wars the region contributed approximately eleven infantry battalions to the European and Middle Eastern theaters.

Over the last 20 years the region, unlike most of the developing world, has undergone significant economic and socio-cultural changes. With the increase in energy costs in the early 1970s and the less than proportionate increase in world prices for primary commodities produced in the region, many countries found themselves in a recession with rising inflation and a growing population competing for limited resources.

Urbanization took place rapidly because prices of the agriculture products remained stable and the people moved to the cities in search of more profitable employment. The inability of the countries

in the region to attract foreign investment also led to serious economic problems and a significant rise in unemployment. Most of the countries sought assistance from the International Monetary Fund (I.M.F.), which added to their problems. The conditions imposed by the I.M.F. caused serious social problems, and in many cases increased unemployment.

The question of defense in the region came to light in Grenada in 1983 and Haiti in 1994. To a large extent the instability in the region was caused by the economic and political problems during the 1970s. Diverse countries approached these problems in different ways and some, for example, Grenada, sought socialism/communism as the answer.

The present period still sees instability in the area due to economic problems caused by the low prices of agriculture products on which the region depends. The rapid rise in manufactured products and oil prices on which the countries rely are also factors. The governments in the region are also a cause for concern because the Westminster type of government gives the prime minister immense power and this has been abused in many cases and has led to friction.

The layout of the countries in the region is at Figure 30 and the demographic and geographic profile is at annex A.

The Colonial and Post-Colonial Era

The Caribbean was first occupied by the Arawaks, an Indian people from the coastal region of what today is Venezuela and Guyana.² The only trace of these people today is found in historical settlements that have been preserved and protected as part of the cultural heritage of the region.

In 1492, Christopher Columbus discovered the New World which makes up the Caribbean today. The first European colonization was in

1510 when a group of Spaniards, under the leadership of Governor Juan de Esquivel, founded the settlement of Seville la Nueva in Jamaica.³

The colonization of the region by the Spaniards saw the eradication of the Arawaks. The Spaniards brought with them diseases such as smallpox, measles, and bubonic plague, which took a heavy toll on the Indians. Others were killed by the Spaniards directly by massacres and indirectly by forcing them to work as serfs, conditions to which they were not accustomed.

In the seventeenth century Spanish dominance in the region was challenged by other European powers. At the end of the Napoleonic Wars, Britain emerged supreme in the region and added its mark on the culture of the region.

The economy of the region was characterized by two common features: monoculture and absentee ownership.⁴ Agriculture became big business, especially sugar production. Agriculture required a large labor force which was provided by slaves imported from Africa. The profitability of the Caribbean provided Britain with money to fund the European wars of the era. This money contributed to the dominance of Britain during this period and the importance of the region became evident.

After the emancipation of slavery in the nineteenth century the free slaves established themselves as independent cultivators, which created a shortage of laborers on the vast plantations. This deficit was filled by importing indentured laborers from Asia, in particular India. This created problems because the culture of the Asians conflicted with the other cultures that existed. The tension is still present in countries such as Trinidad and Guyana and is a cause of friction.

The transition of the region through the period of decolonization saw attempts of a Caribbean integration in the form of

the West Indian Federation, but this failed because it was not promoted by Britain and most of the colonies did not support it.

The West India Regiment was formed from the Federal Defense Force and saw action in World War I and World War II where its soldiers acquitted themselves admirably. With the demise of the West Indian Federation the West India Regiment was broken up, with the 1st and 3rd Battalions going to Jamaica and the 2nd Battalion to Trinidad and Tobago.⁵

The post-colonial period of the 1960s saw no significant structural changes. The mainly agrarian economy with absentee ownership was reminiscent of the colonial era. Despite the many changes in the welfare of workers and government participation in molding the economy, the islands have remained mainly agrarian in nature.

The period of the 1970s saw the prices of agricultural products staying relatively stable compared with the prices of manufactured products. Because of the dependence of the islands on mainly agricultural products serious problems developed and the economy of the region declined. Automation, which could have reduced production costs, was elusive because the cost was out of reach of the countries.

The big increase in oil prices during the 1970s and 1980s created more problems and led to the devaluation of many currencies. The I.M.F.'s assistance was sought. The IMF helped the balance of payment deficit problems but created serious social problems because of the harsh measures imposed, such as the elimination of the subsidies on basic food items. Many governments of the region looked for alternatives and some countries, such as Grenada, experimented with communism which created tension in the region.

Economic and Political Stability in the Region

The 1990s have been relatively stable but there is potential for problems because there is still high unemployment and the Westminster system of government practiced in the region is a cause for concern because it gives the prime minister immense power. This power has been used in the past for personal and party advantage. A number of countries in the region are closely examining this problem and are looking to a presidential type of government similar to the U.S. where the legislature is separated from the executive and the power of the president/prime minister is restricted because of checks and balances ingrained in the system.

In this new era of economic and political uncertainties and global competitiveness, in which the small nations of the Caribbean are compelled to compete with the larger and richer nations, can stability be obtained? One cannot positively say yes, and therefore the region must be prepared for any eventualities. The economic data is at annex B and the security data is at annex C.

International Relations and Alignment in the Region

Traditionally the region has close links with Britain, going back to the colonial past where Britain was dominant in the region and ruled the countries.

The post-colonial period saw the countries of the region trying to break from their colonial past. Breaking away has been very difficult because the economics have been fragile and the region had to depend on the superpowers for security and economic assistance.

The 1980s and 1990s saw the emergence of the U.S. as a major force in the region in terms of security and economic assistance. The U.S. has ensured that the region remains relatively stable by taking military or diplomatic action when necessary. Military action was taken

in Grenada when diplomacy failed, whereas diplomacy worked in Haiti. To ensure economic stability, the U.S. has granted millions of dollars in aid to the region to assist the defense forces and meet other areas of need.

Endnotes

¹Gary Brana Shelte, Democracy in the Caribbean: Anglophone, Haiti, Dominican Republic and Suriname. A paper prepared for the Caribbean Security Symposium, cosponsored by the U.S. Atlantic command and the National Defense University, in Miami, Florida, 17-19 April 1995.

²Marcel Bayer, In Focus: Jamaica. A Guide to the People, Politics and Culture (London, England: Latin America Bureau, Research and Action, LTD, 1993), 7.

³Ibid., 8.

⁴The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Latin America and the Caribbean. 2d ed., ed. Simon Collier and Thomas E. Skediani, the late Herold Blackmore, Cambridge University Press, 311.

⁵Major Neil C. Lewis, JDF, "Combined Operations A Commonwealth Perspective" (Master of Military Art and Science Thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1988), 25.

CHAPTER 2

THE THREAT TO THE REGION

Background to the Threat

The threat to the Commonwealth Caribbean area goes back to colonial days. During this period the countries had a socio-political system in which the people were divided into specific classes: the rich landowners who in many cases lived in England and were known as absentee landowners; the overseers who ran the estates and were either whites or mulattoes; and the slaves who were African workers. This division caused tension in the region and the slaves resisted both actively and passively. Many escaped and formed into groups and attacked the political and economic structure of the islands. An example of this was the Maroons in Jamaica. This name was derived from the Spanish word *Cimarron* meaning "wild."¹ The Maroon War lasted from 1690-1739 and was a constant menace to the British. Remnants of this class division can still be found in the region today and is a cause for concern. The majority of the population are descendents of slaves and about 30 percent of them live below the poverty line. This poverty is a major threat to the stability of the region.

After emancipation the situation was further complicated because in order to fill the vacuum in the labor force left by the freed slaves, authorities brought in indentured laborers from East India and China. These laborers added a new dimension in the class structure of the region. On islands such as Trinidad ethnic tension developed and is still evident today and is cause for concern. In the twentieth century

the immigration of Chinese, Portuguese, Syrians, and Lebanese took place and produced minorities with the potential for social mobility.

The 1960s saw the islands gaining their independence. However, little changed in terms of social structure, and mobility between the classes was negligible. During this period many multinational corporations took advantage of the situation and established themselves in the region. They played an important part in the struggling economies and contributed greatly to the wellbeing of the people.

In the 1970s and 1980s substantial nationalization of foreign-owned corporations took place and the economies of the region fell substantially because the islands were not able to take advantage of this situation. The pressures of the developed countries and the slump in the world economy, due to the oil crisis, also contributed significantly to the problems and caused tension.

Economic Instability

The colonial period was characterized by a carefully controlled economy by the British government. The economy was an agrarian one where the chief export was sugar cane, which brought prosperity to Britain and was used to finance wars and expansion.

After independence the economy showed growth mainly because of the agricultural products which commanded a good price and major investments by multinational companies, e.g., bauxite in Jamaica and oil in Trinidad.

The 1970s and 1980s saw a decline in the economy because of rising oil prices which led to massive inflation and the huge rise in the price of manufactured products. The price increase of agricultural products did not keep pace with the price increase of manufactured products and the region was adversely affected. The nationalization of many of these industries also assisted in the decline because the

governments did not have the expertise or the technology to make these industries a success. The economies of the region did not recover from the negative effects of the 1970s and 1980s. The region tried to combat the inflation in 1965, by forming the Caribbean Free Trade Association (CARIFTA), which was succeeded by the Caribbean Common Market (CARICOM) in 1973. The organizations attempted regional economic integration through market forces and was established to promote intraregional trade through trade liberalization by removing duties, licensing arrangements, and quotas and other tariffs and nontariff barriers.²

In 1982, the Caribbean Basin Initiative was launched by American President Ronald Reagan to promote economic development and political stability through trade, economic assistance, and investment incentive measures to generate economic growth.³ This program created some growth but was not enough to generate any meaningful or lasting growth in employment.

The 1990s saw some improvement because of initiatives such as promotion of the tourist industry and incentives to overseas investors such as tax relief. However, the improvements were not enough to have any meaningful reduction in unemployment. High unemployment is a potential threat to the stability of the region and contributed indirectly to the problems in Haiti which led to the intervention of the multinational forces led by the Americans in 1994. If the threat of poverty is not removed, lasting peace in the region will only be a vision.

Political Instability

The political systems of the Commonwealth Caribbean have been stable, but fragile. All have inherited strong democratic traditions and parliamentary systems of government formed on the Westminster model. Political succession has been generally peaceful and democratic. The

British had hoped to lessen the vulnerability of the smaller islands by making them part of a larger, more viable state but this failed and was deeply resented. In 1967 the Anguillians evicted the Kittitian Police Force from the island and declared independence which eventually the British agreed to.⁴

The region includes some of the world's freest nations. Freedom House of New York publishes Freedom Review magazine which covers issues of international affairs, human rights and freedom of the press since 1970. It also does an annual survey which evaluates political rights and civil liberties everywhere in the world and ranks them on a seven category scale. It ranked Barbados and Belize in the most free category in the world with the remainder of countries in the region in the free category, with the exception of Guyana whose entry in the free group was heralded by its first free and fair election in 25 years in 1992.⁵

The political history of the region has led to many of the current problems. The British Westminster Parliamentary system of government was adopted by the nations of the region after independence mainly because of the influence of the British in the region's colonial past. This system was inappropriate for the islands because it was a system that gave the prime minister an abundant amount of power which was exploited in a number of nations, such as Grenada, under Sir Eric Gary. This problem still exists and is a cause for concern. Some islands, for example, Jamaica, are presently examining their constitution and making reforms to limit the power of the prime minister and separate the legislature from the executive. The reforms have been very slow in coming and the issue has been fueled by the younger politicians who want radical changes compared with the older politicians, who prefer conservative changes that will leave the power in the hands of the executive.

The fragility of the systems of governments in the region causes tension and a reliance on violence for political ends. A classic example is the overthrow of Grenada's democratically elected but corrupt government in the 1980s. The self-styled People's Revolutionary Government, led by the popular Maurice Bishop was established, then there was the bloody removal of that government and replacement by a hard-line communist military council. This situation led to the military intervention by a coalition of the United States and defense and police forces from six Commonwealth Caribbean nations: Jamaica, Barbados, Antigua and Bermuda, Dominica, Saint Lucia and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. Prior to this situation in Grenada, the Dominican government in 1981 foiled a coup attempt involving a former prime minister. As recently as 1990, the Jamaat Al Muslimeens also attempted to overthrow the duly elected government of Trinidad and Tobago and these events are evidence that the threat is still alive.

Narcotics Trafficking

Within the last decade the international community has been infested with the scourge of drug abuse, drugs and arms trafficking, and their attendant evils. The region has not avoided this ill and it is a very real and potent threat today. In Colombia one sees the extent to which criminal elements have gone to maintain and control this evil investment.

The region has become increasingly important as a transit point for the transshipment of narcotics from Latin America to the United States. Narcotic traffickers have afforded large payoffs to Caribbean officials to ensure safe passage of their products through the region. In 1985 a Miami jury convicted Chief Minister Norman Saunders of the Turks and Caicos Islands of involvement in narcotics. In 1988 a prosecution witness in the Jacksonville, Florida, trial of Colombian

cocaine trafficker Carlos Lehder Rivas claimed that Lehder paid Bahamian Prime Minister Lynden O. Pindling \$88,000 per month to protect Colombian drug operations.⁶ According to the United States Drug Enforcement Agency Office of Intelligence "Caribbean Threat Assessment for 1993," the amount of cocaine transshipped through Venezuela and, by extension, the Caribbean, is in the vicinity of ten to thirteen tons per month.

The region is also actively involved in producing significant amounts of narcotics. According to the Department of State, in 1992 approximately 13 to 15 percent of the marijuana shipped to the United States came from the region, in particular Jamaica. Because of the huge gains involved in this evil operation the traffickers have been able to bribe their way through the entire spectrum of society including the administration. Because of the affluence of these persons, they present a threat.

The narcotics network has become an underworld superpower which constitutes enormous danger to the survival of democracy, e.g., in Colombia. In order to eliminate this threat nations must work together because, if ignored, the Commonwealth Caribbean nations could easily find it increasingly difficult to maintain their sovereignty. The huge amounts of money involved could easily equip an army that could take over the smaller governments in the region.

There is also a limited external threat in the region due to border disputes that have been continued from the region's colonial past, where borders were ill defined. The primary areas where these disputes are centered are between Venezuela and Guyana and between Belize and Guatemala. Both these claims have effectively prevented full normalization of relationship between the countries. There are also minor border disputes between Guyana and Suriname, Brazil and Guyana, and Venezuela and Trinidad and Tobago.

In the case of Guyana and Venezuela the dispute involves nearly two-thirds of the territory of Guyana. Arbitration has been going on for years in this area with the U.S.A. as the chief mediator. However, Venezuela has committed itself to seeking resolution by arbitration and this has prevented the conclusion of the matter. There have been accusations of territorial encroachment by both sides, and as long as the matter is not concluded a threat exists.⁷

The dispute between Belize and Guatemala is also alive and successive Guatemalan regimes have recognized Belize as the twenty-third department of Guatemala. Britain has stationed troops in Belize over the years even though it gained independence in 1981. However, Britain has been reducing its commitment and will eventually pull out. In 1978 Prime Minister George Price of Belize approached the governments of the Commonwealth Caribbean and received from them a security guarantee.⁸ The Belizean situation has heightened since the passing of resolution 35/20 by the United Nations (UN) in 1980 which guarantees Belizean independence.⁹ It is believed that the reason for Guatemala's persistence in its claims is because the Punta Gorda region is believed to be rich in oil deposits. In 1991 Guatemala announced that it would recognize Belize and open diplomatic relations as a prelude to settling the two countries territorial dispute. In May 1993, Guatemalan President Jorge Serrano seized dictatorial power in his country with army support which caused concern in Belize even though he made a statement renouncing Guatemala's traditional claim to Belize and proposing that this be incorporated in a pact. He was removed from office before the agreement could be ratified. As long as this dispute is not concluded the threat to the sovereignty of Belize and, in extension, to the region remains.

Endnotes

¹Marcel Bayer, Jamaica in Focus A Guide to the People, Politics and Culture (London, England: Latin America Bureau (Research and Action) LTD, 1993), 12.

²Islands of the Commonwealth Caribbean A Regional Study. Federal Research Division Library of Congress, edited by Sandra W. Medity and Dennis M. Hannathy, appendix C.

³Ibid., Appendix D.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Gary Brana-Shute, Democracy and Security in the Caribbean: Anglophobe, Haiti, Dominican Republic and Suriname, a paper prepared for the Caribbean Security Symposium in Miami, Florida, 17-19 April 1995.

⁶Islands of the Commonwealth Caribbean A Regional Study. Federal Research Division Library of Congress, edited by Sandra W. Medity and Dennis M. Hannathy, appendix d.

⁷Barbara Crossette. "Venezuela Wants Land Talk with Guyana," New York Times, 19 May 82, A11.

⁸Allan J. Day. Border and Territorial Disputes, 2d ed. (London, England: Burtmill, Harlow, Essex, 1987), 346-350.

⁹Ibid.

CHAPTER 3

REVIEW OF LITERATURE AND METHODOLOGY

Review of Literature

Four main areas were identified in researching this paper: history, threat, a Regional Defense Force and a possible deployment scenario focusing on Belize. The first two topics have been covered.

The history of the region was well documented because it was closely tied to British and European history. The British dominance over the region during the nineteenth century has left lasting impressions on the culture, government and politics of the different countries. This influence led to a class division: the ruling class who owned the lands; the business class made up the immigrants, such as Chinese, Lebanese, and others; and the working class made up of descendents of the slaves. This class structure has been eroded over the years, with more of the working class progressing into the business and ruling class because of better education and increased opportunities.

The Commonwealth Caribbean is made up of a diverse group of states bonded together by a common history, culture, and politics. The dominance of the British influence in these areas has made the research for historical defense data difficult because the defense is tied up in the British and European wars. Little or no action was seen in the Caribbean area.

The period of the 1960s and 1970s saw the islands of the region gaining independence and the reduction of the British influence and

dominance in the region. The United States emerged as the dominant power in the region but because the threat in the area apart from Cuba was negligible not much documentation can be found on defense data. However, the threat posed by Cuba and the missile crisis is well documented because of the impact on the security of the region, especially the United States.

The Grenadian operation (Operation Urgent Fury) put the region on the international map and volumes of literature were written about it in all areas except the Commonwealth Caribbean contribution. However, this crisis served a good purpose because it brought to light the lack of security in the region and the limited means of defense that the countries possessed. The Commonwealth Caribbean subsequently commissioned a study into the vulnerability of the small states, the result of which was published and already has been felt.¹

Most of the scholarly works of Operation Urgent Fury focused on the political aspects and later much attention was placed on the performance of the U.S. forces. Only a few short documented articles about the performance of the Caribbean forces could be found.

One of the most valuable works on the security aspect of the region was Anthony Maingot's article on the regional security perspective. The political aspect was well covered by Dun and Watson in American Intervention in Grenada; Crogg's The U.S. Army in Grenada; and Schoenbals and Melerson's Revolution and Intervention in Grenada.

The problems faced by combined operations were highlighted by Hixson and Coolings in Combined Operations in Peace and War. However, the most valuable insights were gained from the thesis author's personal experience during this operation.

Because of the stability of the region with the exception of Cuba and Haiti little documented material can be found on the threat to the region. Most of the material was collected from minutes of seminars

on security and cooperation in the region and also operational declassified material on contingency and operational plans. Recently, because of the serious problems posed by the Colombian drug cartels to the sovereignty of Colombia, numerous articles have been published warning against the dangers posed to the Caribbean by these drug cartels.

The present security posture has seen the Caribbean stimulated by the political momentum generated by the Grenadian crisis, expanding the Regional Security System (RSS) from five to seven nations: Antigua and Bermuda, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia and Saint Vincent, and the Grenadines. This plan was based on the Adams Doctrine² which called for fast, highly mobile conventional military forces capable of being a deterrent. The United States was instrumental in the training of the RSS using mobile training teams (MTTs) from Fort Bragg and also in equipping the RSS through the Military Assistance Program (MAP). The British, on the other hand, felt obligated to assist in the regional security because of their historical attachment and in some cases agreement, e.g., with Belize. They also commissioned a study in the defense of Commonwealth ministates and the report recommended greater willingness on the part of the more developed commonwealth nations to provide small commonwealth states with an alternative to the U.S. for military assistance.³

However, this stimulus created by the momentum of the Grenadian crisis soon lost its drive because the U.S. financial and military support was reduced and Barbados, on whose shoulders the control and most of the financial liability fell, also was forced to cut back its commitment because of political pressure. In March 1986 an RSS training study team was commissioned with the intention of establishing a regional approach to RSS training. The team recommended that the training should be structured in two areas: a common training geared to

internal security (IS) and police type training for countries without military forces and military training for the countries with military forces. The policemen, however, would be required to be in para-military units because U.S. military personnel are prohibited by U.S. law from training policemen. An annual security chiefs training conference was also established to coordinate the program and a means of integrating U.S. military doctrine with British doctrine which is common to the region was also recommended. A yearly exercise code name Operation Tradewinds was also introduced as a result of this program. This exercise involves the Commonwealth Caribbean states and the U.S. However, this is the only form of a regional force that exists and is inadequate to meet security needs of the region. The training of these police forces with limited military input is an illusion and they cannot defend the region against the threat mentioned in chapter 2.

The data used to develop the remainder of this thesis came mainly come from the author's personal experience in light infantry forces and doctrine on the employment of light forces. The external threat posed by Guatemala to Belize is fairly well documented inclusive of the opposing forces strength that is used to depict a scenario where Belize is attacked by Guatemala and the response by the Regional Defense Force.

Methodology

The question posed by the thesis: Is there a need for a Regional Defense Force in the Caribbean and what should its structure be? was examined analytically using an analytical matrix looking at the need for a Regional Defense Force, a supporting matrix looking at the support of the U.S. at the strategic level; and a CGSC strategic analysis model evaluating U.S. strategic interest in the region.

The problem faced in gathering the data was mainly a lack of information on the defense of the Caribbean because historically the defense was tied to Britain and obscured by the British and European wars and the relative stability of the region. The only focus on the defense of the region was after the Grenadian crisis and thereafter it died. There was also a lack of will on the part of the governments of the region mainly because they did not believe that the security of their respective countries could be challenged, and also the lack of funding for the programs. The countries also cherished their diverse individuality and culture and it was only after the Grenadian operation that they realized it could have been their country that was involved in conflict.

The research methodology was designed to be flexible because of the diverse nature of the region in terms of the economics, people, culture, religion, and politics. The problems faced in gathering data and the wide scope of the paper also ensured that the paper remained flexible.

The analytical matrix at figure 1 looks at the need for a Regional Defense Force and the factors that support or do not support this view. It examines the factors from the Caribbean perspective with emphasis on the threat, funding and the will of the governments to support a Regional Defense Force. The weighting of this matrix is based on personal experience and historical data outlined in the previous chapters.

The low score of fifteen from a possible fifty points indicate that from the perspective of the Caribbean there is a need for a Regional Defense Force. However, the region is not able to fund, equip, administer, or train such a force and needs external help. The country with the most influence in the region and that has geographical, security, and economic interest in the region is the U.S. Despite the

emergence of new power centers, the U.S. remains the only state with truly global strength, reach and influence in every dimension: political, economic, and military.⁴ Therefore, it is in the interests of the U.S. to lead the formation of such a force which will pay dividends in the future by ensuring stability in the region.

| FACTORS | WEIGHT | REMARKS |
|--|--------|---|
| (1) Present threat requires a Regional Defense Force | 2 | The threat poses a serious problem, came to light during the Grenadian crisis and also the threat to Colombia by the Drug Cartels. |
| (2) Present security arrangements meet needs. | 2 | Shown in Chapter 2 threat analysis that present security arrangement is inadequate. |
| (3) Present forces in the Caribbean adequate to deter threat. | 3 | - Forces designed for internal security purposes. - Organization and equipment of forces shown at Annex E. |
| (4) Government in region support to regional defense. | 5 | Government in region divided, anti military political sentiment shown in St. Vincent where it was declared that the country needed economic and technical aid, not guns ⁵ reflects a lack of cooperation and cohesion between the different governments. |
| (5) The ability of the countries of the region to fund a regional force inclusive of equipment and training. | 3 | Because of sagging economies the countries of the region are unable to fund such a force. |
| Total | 15 | Max of 50. |

Figure 1. Analytical Matrix. (Figure by author.)

Note that 1 indicates the most need for a regional force and 10 indicates the least need for a regional force.

The supporting matrix shown at figure 2 examines the need for the U.S. to support a Regional Defense Force based on the National Security Strategy which states that leadership must stress preventive diplomacy through such means as support for democracy, economic assistance, overseas military presence, military to military contacts, and involvement in multilateral negotiations.⁶ Again the weighting of the matrix is based on personal experience and historical data outlined in previous chapters.

| FACTORS | WEIGHT | REMARKS |
|---|--------|--|
| (1) Provide a credible presence in the region | 2 | No credible presence However mutual agreement is provided for security purposes. |
| (2) Contributing to multilateral operations. | 4 | Limited due to reduced funding. Only one exercise - Trade Winds which takes place annually. |
| (3) Supporting counter terrorism efforts. | 5 | Cooperation in intelligence collation and dissemination takes place between respective agencies. |
| (4) Fighting drug trafficking. | 6 | Reduction taking place because of lack of funding. |
| (5) Protecting lives of Americans in times of conflict. | 2 | Because of lack of a capable presence in the region this potential is limited. |
| (6) Promoting stability in the region. | 5 | Cuba still poses a threat to the region and although the remainder of the region is relatively stable the governments are fragile because of the threat: poverty, politics and drug trafficking. |
| TOTAL | 24 | MAX 60 |

Figure 2. Supporting Matrix. (Figure by author.)

Note that 1 least support U.S. national strategy in the region, 10 most support U.S. national strategy in the region.

The score of 24 from a possible 60 supports the evidence that the U.S. should support a regional force in the region because it is in keeping with the criterion laid down by the U.S. national security strategy and

| | | |
|--------|---|--|
| STEP 1 | State the Problem(s) and State Assumptions | Problem: The need for a Regional Defense Force in the Caribbean. Assumption: There will be need to protect the sovereignty of countries of the region because of the threat Chap 2. |
| STEP 2 | Identify Relevant Actors and Interests a. Identify actors b. Identify interests c. Determine significance of interests d. Recognize conflicting and complementary interests. | Actors: Commonwealth Caribbean Countries/United States of America Interests: Economic - important because the U.S. is the main trading partner of the region. Security - very important because of the close proximity of the region to the U.S. and the threat of drug cartels to the U.S. Strategic location - sea lanes close to the U.S. and along major shipping routes. |
| STEP 3 | Assess Each Actor's Power to Pursue Interests a. Assess the five elements of power for each principal actor b. Identify areas of strength and weakness/vulnerability c. Relate strength and weaknesses or vulnerabilities to national interests d. Determine likely objectives and policies of each actor | Elements of Power Geography - The region, although relatively small, is significant to the U.S. because of its close proximity and lies along major shipping lanes. Population - The population of the region is closely linked to the U.S. because of migration e.g. General Powell parents are Jamaicans. Economy - The U.S. is the main trading partner of the region and many U.S. companies have branches in the region. National Will - The majority of the population are pro American and pro a Regional Defense Force because of the lessons learned from the Grenadian crisis. National Direction - With the exception of a few governments noted in Chap 2, the support for a Regional Defense Force is overwhelming. The region is very vulnerable because the region is poor and cannot equip and sustain a Regional Defense Force without assistance. The military forces are small and geared towards internal security. Because of the fragile nature of the governments of the region and the lack of a capable deterrent small countries could be overthrown e.g. Grenada. This is a threat to the stability of the region and will affect the national strategy policy of the U.S. The objective of the governments of the region is to seek the assistance of the U.S. in establishing and maintaining a Regional Defense Force to ensure stability of the region. |
| STEP 4 | Develop Policy Options a. Identify possible options based on national power and interests b. Predict responses to each option (most probable scenario) c. Evaluate options based on responses d. Modify and/or combine options | The options of the U.S.: 1. Maintain current limited assistance in terms of defense of the region. 2. Form a Regional Defense Force that is a capable deterrent. The governments of the region would accept the formation of a Regional Defense Force with the U.S. leading the effort, because this will enhance the security of the region and prevent situations such as the Grenadian and Haitian crisis. |
| STEP 5 | Reach Conclusions and Make Recommendations | Because of the threat to the region and the close ties in terms of economics, people and strategic location, it is beneficial to the U.S. and the Commonwealth Caribbean to form a Regional Defense Force that will ensure stability in the region and protect the U.S. interest in the region in keeping with the national security strategies. |

Figure 3. Strategic Analysis Model. Source: National Strategic appraisal flow chart (Modified) (Figure by author.)

in extension the national military strategy which have the three components of peacetime engagement, deterrence and conflict prevention, and fighting and winning.⁷ The higher the score shows that the U.S. policies in the region supports the national strategy.

The conclusion looks at the CGSC strategic analysis model shown at figure 3. This examines whether there is sufficient reason basing the argument on the national security strategy for the U.S. to jointly establish a Regional Defense Force in the Caribbean region. The answer is yes based on the strategic analysis model.

Now that the need for a Regional Defense Force is established we will look at a proposed structure in Chapter 5.

Endnotes

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⁵Department of Defense, National Security Strategy of the U.S., Washington. D.C., GPO, August 1991, 2.

⁴B. Dredrich, The End of West Indies Innocence, Caribbean Review, Spring 1984, 10-12.

⁶The White House, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, Washington, D.C., GPO, February 1995, 7.

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CHAPTER 4
A COMMONWEALTH CARIBBEAN REGIONAL DEFENSE
FORCE RECOMMENDED STRUCTURE

After examining the analysis that showed that there is a need for a Regional Defense Force in the Caribbean with the U.S. playing a vital role, this chapter will examine a recommended structure looking at three levels: strategic, operational, and tactical. It is essential that the force must be capable of deploying anywhere in the region very rapidly, have enough firepower to defeat any threat, be capable of establishing beachheads because of the wide coastlines, and be trained and equipped to be a professional force.

Rapid deployment is very important because history has shown that crisis situations in the Caribbean develop very fast and if left unchecked will grow quickly, for example, the Grenadian crisis.¹ This environment calls for a light force that can be deployed with relative ease and is available for deployment at short notice. The force must also be equipped with easily deployable stores and equipment that is configured and stored centrally for easy deployment.

Having enough firepower is critical and in the Grenadian intervention the Rangers and 82nd Airborne troops were delayed initially because of the lack of adequate firepower. This force must have enough air interdiction, close air support, armor, and field artillery to support the ground troops. The C-130 gunship proved to be very effective in this type of operation and this was shown in Grenada.² The force must also be tailored to meet the threat and the recommended structure will be a base from which to operate. Depending on the threat, additional forces can be provided by the participating

countries, for example, a threat by Guatemala will require some armor and air interdiction input because of the capability of the Guatemalan force.

Establishing a beachhead is very important because every country in the region has a sizable coastline. In Operation Urgent Fury the U.S. Marines conducted three landings in seven days both by landing craft and helicopters. The Navy secured the seas, provided carrier air power, and landed the Marines.³ The importance of a naval element in this force cannot be overemphasized, and history has proven that every military operation in the region (Grenada and Panama) have had a naval landing. This environment calls for a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) which has all the necessary ingredients and can be tailored to meet any threat. This element will be discussed later. In Grenada an MEU was used very effectively.⁴

The importance of training is very important and this was one of the failures of the Grenadian operation. Training must take place at the joint and combined level to ensure that units can operate together, without interservice and international tension which was noted in Operation Urgent Fury.⁵ The Caribbean Peace Keeping Force (CPF) before the Grenadian Operation conducted only limited training with the U.S. forces at small unit levels, for example, special forces training teams.

Therefore, the CPF was limited in what missions it could effectively carry out in Operation Urgent Fury. Joint and combined training could have ironed out most of these problems with each element knowing the potential and capabilities of the other.

Equipment is also a factor that must be carefully examined because joint and combined service equipment must be compatible in terms of deployability and operability. The CPF was not equipped to be deployed rapidly and during the Grenadian operation this weakness caused serious problems leading to essential equipment being left behind. The need for dedicated air and sealift capability is clearly shown and must

be planned for. Communication was also a weak point at the joint and combined levels in the Grenadian operation. Signal equipment must be compatible in order to decrease the possibility of fratricide.

At the strategic level the organization must reflect a multinational structure that will clearly delineate the ruling authority responsible for implementing policy, formulating missions, and authorizing resources. This body would operate at the prime ministerial and presidential level through the Caribbean Defense Board made up of prime ministers of the respective Caribbean countries and the U.S. National Command Authority (NCA) chaired by the U.S. President. The policies and decisions will be fed into a multinational alliance authority that will be staffed by the governments of the Caribbean countries and the government of the U.S. at the ambassadorial level. At these two levels there should be annual meetings to discuss policy and also emergency meetings when there is a crisis.

Instructions will be sent from the multinational alliance authority to the combined command which is a permanent establishment directed from a combined command headquarters with a combined staff and a single combined commander and a deputy commander. This will be discussed at the operational level. Subordinate national commands, however, must maintain their national integrity. Figure 4 shows the hierarchy of command relationships at the strategic level. The establishment of the command relationships and operating procedures within this multinational force must be carefully worked out because it normally involves complex issues that require compromise. It must also be remembered that national pride and prestige are at stake.

At the operational level the task organization must be task oriented reflecting rapid deployment by light forces, with amphibious elements because of wide coastal areas, combat power, and a multinational organization. The force must also be capable of being tailored to meet specific threats although a base structure from which




Figure 4. Strategic Command Structure. (Figure by author.)

to build must be established. Figure 5 shows the task organization at the operational level which meets the factors outlined: It must be capable of rapid deployment, and there must be an Air Force element designated that is capable of lifting the force. There must also be an amphibious unit that can be used to establish and secure a beachhead because of the wide coastline, and there must be adequate combat power that can be generated from the organic resources. In particular, there must be close air support and air interdiction capability provided by the Air Force element. The force must be multinational in nature reflecting the Caribbean unit which is under the command of the combined

commander who should be U.S., a subordinate Caribbean forces commander, and a special forces element must also be added to provide some depth and flexibility to the force which can be used for hostage rescue and infiltration operations.




Figure 5. Task Organization. (Figure by author.)

The combined headquarters will be a permanent headquarters with a combined staff. There will be a single combined commander (US), a commander for U.S. forces, and a commander for Caribbean forces to maintain national integrity. The coordinating staff officers will be U.S. with a Caribbean officer providing the necessary coordination at this level. The special staff will include representatives from the different units who act as special advisors to the combined commander. This is shown at figure 6.

It is to be noted that at the operational level because of the large combined staff element a peacetime and a wartime structure will be used and the wartime structure shown at figure 6 will only be used during wartime deployment or for exercise purposes. The peacetime




Figure 6. Command--Combined Force Organization. (Figure by author.)

organization will see a reduced structure which will deal with the day-to-day running of the force and will be colocated with Atlantic Command which is responsible for the region. However, this can change in the future because there are plans to transfer responsibility of the region to Southern Command which is more practical because Central and South America, which is closely linked to the Caribbean, falls under the Southern Command. The peacetime structure is shown at figure 7.

The primary unit at the tactical level is a brigade. This is organized so that it can be easily reinforced if the situation warrants. This structure must also have adequate combat support and combat service support to administer to the troops. The headquarters company should consist of U.S. and Caribbean forces to support the maneuver battalions. The field artillery battalion should be composed of U.S. troops and this will be a brigade asset. The forward support battalion (FSB) will be tailored to support the brigade and will be joint




Figure 7. Peace Time Command--Combined Force Organization. (Figure by author.)

servicing (function performed by a jointly staffed and finance activity in support of two or more military services). There will be two Caribbean battalions, two U.S. light battalions, a Marine Expeditionary Unit (SOC) and U.S. Air Force squadron tailored to support the operation. This will include C-130 gunships (Spectre) which are effective in low-intensity conflicts. There will also be a comparable size brigade reconnaissance element that will provide covering and screening capabilities. The military intelligence platoon will be jointly staffed by U.S. and Caribbean forces to collate information at a centralized level with unity of effort. The attack helicopter company will support the operation and will have additional lift assets so that it can also transport troops. There should also be a U.S. engineer team tailored to support the particular mission and a special operations force detachment that specializes in the region. The organization is shown at figure 8.

The structure of MEU SOC is shown at figure 9. It is to be noted that this structure is flexible and can be tailored to support the mission. However, this is a base structure that is a building block.





Figure 8. Combined Brigade Structure. (Figure by author.)

Symbol Identification:



The structure of the U.S. light infantry battalion is shown at figure 10.

Because of the diverse nature of the Caribbean, the structure of the battalions will be shown in two parts. In order to maintain the national integrity of the forces, they will be grouped together in countries as far as possible. There is also a need to define the command structure in order to achieve unity of effort leading to a common objective. National pride and prestige must not take precedence over efficiency, and the method to define the command structure should





Figure 9. Marine Expeditionary Unit Structure (SOC). (Source: MAJ John F. Schmitt USMCR, "Neo from Instabilia," Marine Corp Gazette (Oct 93), 59.

Symbol Identification:



be to use the number of troops as the weighting factor. Therefore, this organization will reflect a command structure based on numbers of troops. The first battalion is shown at figure 11 and the second battalion at figure 12.

The entire force will come together only for operations and an annual training over an eight-week period. Training will take place from the individual to the brigade level. Individual to company level training will take place in the respective countries and battalion to brigade level training will take place at a place to be determined.

Different countries will be used yearly and funding will be met jointly by all countries. Training and development of the force to include funding, will be discussed in greater details in chapter 6.





Figure 10. US Battalion Structure (Source: LT Chadwick W. Storlie "Guide for Light Infantry Company XO," Infantry (Jan-Feb 94), 32-39.

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


Figure 11. First Battalion CDF. (Figure by author.)

Symbol Identification:

BN CDR = Battalion Commander BN XO = Battalion Executive Officer ACOY = Alpha Company
 BCOY = Bravo Company CCOY = Charlie Company S1 = Personnel Officer
 S2 = Intelligence Staff S3 = Operation Officer S4 = Logistic Officer
 CC = Chief Clerk MTO = Motor Transport MED = Medical M/COOK = Master Cook
 RQMS = Regimental Quartermaster Sergeant RSM = Regimental Sergeant Major
 INT = Intelligence SIG = Signal [] = Platoon [] = Company [] = Battalion
 HQ CO CMD = Headquarters Company Commander




Figure 12. Second Battalion Caribbean Defense Force. (Figure by author.)

Symbol Identification

BN CDR = Battalion Commander BN XO = Battalion Executive Officer ACOY = Alpha Company
 BCOY = Bravo Company CCOY = Charlie Company S1 = Personnel Officer
 S2 = Intelligence Staff S3 = Operation Officer S4 = Logistic Officer
 CC = Chief Clerk MTO = Motor Transport MED = Medical M/COOK = Master Cook
 RQMS = Regimental Quartermaster Sergeant RSM = Regimental Sergeant Major
 INT = Intelligence SIG = Signal [] = Platoon [] = Company [] = Battalion
 HQ CO CMD = Headquarters Company Commander

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¹Captain Daniel P. Bolger, "Special Operations and the Grenada Campaign," Parameters (December 1988): 53.

²Ibid., 57.

³Captain Daniel P. Bolger, U.S. Army: "Operation Urgent Fury and Its Critics," Military Review (July 1986): 66.

⁴Ibid., 61-63.

⁵George C. Washington and Michael Weisskopf, Pentagon, "Congress Seek Cure to Shortcomings Exposed in Grenada Invasion," Washington Post (20 February 1986): A24.

CHAPTER 5

TRAINING AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FORCE

General Carl E. Vuono stated: "The army training mission is to prepare soldiers, leaders, and units to deploy, fight, and win in combat at any intensity level, anywhere, anytime."

- The training focus is on our wartime missions.
- Our top priority is training.
- Maintenance is a vital part of our training program.
- Realistic, sustained, multi-echelon totally integrated combined arms training must be continuously stressed at all levels.
- Every soldier, leader and unit training program must be carefully planned, aggressively executed and thoroughly assessed.¹

Caribbean Defense Force

The training program for the Caribbean Defense Force will be conducted in two phases.

Phase 1 - Infrastructure Development

- Agreement
- Funding
- Staffing
- Equipping

Phase 2 - Training

- Courses
- Individual training
- Squad to company training
- Battalion to brigade training

Developing the infrastructure is very important and this phase must be carefully planned and executed because the entire program depends on this phase. The agreement must be detailed and must cover all responsibilities for funding, equipping, and training. The legal aspects must also be covered and the responsibility for this document must be at governmental level, among the different heads of states. This is because the legal framework guides all actions of the regional force. Once this document is accepted by the respective governments

then the task of putting together the force begins. This agreement must be binding for a minimum of five years and negotiated thereafter. This will ensure that there is enough time to implement the programs developed.

Funding is very important and although the economy of the region is weak each participating country must contribute a fair share to the overall funding of the program. The U.S. government because of its numbers and also the strength of the economy must bear the weight of funding and the recommended amount is 75 percent. The remaining 25 percent will be met by the different Caribbean countries based on the number of troops and the countries without military forces will also contribute as long as they are members of the agreement. The program will be funded annually and this money will be used to staff, equip, and train the force. A finance department will be part of the permanent headquarters to oversee the budget. Tied into the funding will be the U.S. aid and military assistance programs which will supplement the funding.

The organization of the force outlined in chapter 6 and the peace time staff structure shown at figure 7 is responsible for the day-to-day running of the force. They play a very important part because they are responsible for implementing the policies and programs. They will also plan and execute the different training programs and exercises. Salary for the staff will be funded by the individual countries and the different appointments will come from the respective armed forces establishments. This will ensure that the funding is used only for equipping, training, and operational purposes. The wartime staffing shown at figure 6 will be initiated during emergencies and annually for training purposes.

Equipping the forces will have to be phased over time because of the amount of money involved. Presently the force can be formed

without additional equipment because the troops already exist. However, priority must be placed in areas that can be considered war stoppers. The primary area is compatible communication equipment. This was shown in Operation Urgent Fury and must be addressed early. The priority in order for equipping the force should be:

1. Compatible communication equipment
2. Standard weapons and ammunition
3. Standard uniform and personal equipment
4. Vehicles and armored personnel carrier (APC)
5. Aircrafts and ships

The time limit for implementation will depend on the policy and the funding available and this will be set at the governmental level. The end state will be a force that is similarly equipped so that efficiency can be achieved. General Matthew B. Ridgway said that only well armed and equipped, adequately trained, and efficiently led forces can expect victory in future combat.²

Once the infrastructure is in place then comes the arduous task of training the force. This is very important because the countries are diverse in their training; and the predominant doctrine of the region is British. The training must be aimed at consolidating doctrine so that a common ground can be achieved on which to operate.

At the officer and noncommissioned officer level courses must be funded in the U.S. through the Nation Assistance Program in order to consolidate doctrine so that a common operating base is obtained. Courses that cannot be met through the nation assistance program must be funded from the Regional Defense Force budget. These courses must be on a long term basis and priority must be placed on training instructors so they can train the troops.

Training for the troops must be done throughout the year in the respective countries culminating in an annual exercise which will last

for eight weeks. The training must be battle focussed based on wartime requirements. Because all training tasks cannot be covered it is important to identify a mission essential task list (METL). A METL is derived from war plans and external directives which are additional sources of training tasks that relate to an organization's wartime mission. Figure 13 shows the METL development process.³




Figure 13. METL Development Process (Source: U.S. Army, FM 25-100, Training the Force, Soldiers Units and Leaders (Washington, D.C.: Dept. of the Army, November 1988), 2-1.

This process is used by leaders to identify and select mission essential tasks. Below is a recommended mission essential task list.

1. Move by air/road/rail to APOE/SPOE.
2. Draw prepositioned equipment and supplies.
3. Move to assembly area and assemble force.
4. Deploy to combat area of operations.
5. Conduct hasty attack.
6. Conduct mobile defense.
7. Conduct hostage rescue.
8. Conduct establishment of beachheads.
9. Conduct river crossing operations.
10. Conduct protection of rear areas.
11. Conduct Combat Service Support operations to sustain the

force.

These mission essential tasks must be accomplished and assessed each year by an annual exercise. This will follow the training planning process shown at figure 14.




Figure 14. Training Planning Process (Source: U.S. Army, FM 25-100, Training the Force, Soldiers Units and Leaders (Washington, D.C.: Dept. of the Army, November 1988), 3-1.

This process is used to develop battle focussed training programs. General George C. Marshall said that "we cannot train without planning and we cannot teach without preparation."⁴

The training during this exercise will be funded from the Regional Defense Force budget and will be done over three phases which is shown at figure 15.

The exercise will be assessed by a special team of military observers specially selected from the U.S. and the Caribbean and this summary will form the basis for the next years' training program which will aim at reinforcing the strong points and correcting the weak points of the exercise. The next chapter will look at a possible deployment scenario where Belize is invaded by Guatemala. This is realistic because of the history of Guatemala with numerous coups and territorial claims on Belize.

| Week | Phase | METL | Bde | BN | CO | PL | SQD | IND | REMARKS |
|------|-------|---|-----|----|----|----|-----|-----|--|
| 1 | A | - Individual training | | | | | X | | Conducted in respective countries |
| 2 | | - Squad-Plt training | | | X | X | | | Conducted in respective countries |
| 3 | | - Co-Bn Training | | X | X | | | | Conducted in respective countries |
| 4 | B | - Alert/upload move to assembly area (AA) | | X | X | | | | AA U.S.A. |
| 5 | | - Conduct Beach head Ops - Set up Joint Hqs - Patrols - River crossing | X | X | X | X | X | X | Area in the Caribbean to be determined |
| 6 | | - Conduct deliberate defense - Hostage rescue | X | X | X | | | | |
| 7 | | - Conduct offensive operations - Hasty attack - Deliberate attack - night attack | X | X | X | | | | |
| 8 | C | - Post operations exercise and debrief - Move to respective countries | X | X | | | | | |

Figure 15. Regional Force Training Program (U.S. Army, FM 25-100, Training the Force, Soldiers Units and Leaders (Washington, D.C.: Dept of the Army, November 1988), 3-14.

Endnotes

¹U.S. Army, FM 25-100, Training the Force - Soldiers, Units and Leaders (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, November 1988), 1-1.

²Ibid., 4-1.

³Ibid., 2-1.

⁴Ibid., 3-1.

CHAPTER 6

A POSSIBLE DEPLOYMENT SCENARIO--BELIZE

A possible deployment scenario where Guatemala invades Belize is realistic because of the territorial dispute between both countries. Before examining the military operation, an area study of both countries looking at the economic, geographic, and military conditions that presently exist will be carried out.

Guatemala: An Overview

Geography

Guatemala is the third largest of the Central American republics. It is bounded by Mexico to the north and west, by Belize which it claims as part of its territory to the northeast, by the Gulf of Honduras to the east, by the Republic of Honduras to the southeast, by El Salvador to the southwest and by the Pacific Ocean to the west. Almost all of its frontiers are arbitrary and are either the subject of current boundary disputes or have been the subject of such disputes in the past.¹ The climate ranges from temperate in the mountainous regions to tropical in the coastal plains. The rainy season is from May to November, and the national language is Spanish and indigenous Amerindian language. Almost all of the inhabitants profess Christianity and the overwhelming majority are Catholics.

The terrain of Guatemala is undulating, varying from volcanic mountains to limestone plateaus and coastal plains. The highest peak in Central America is found in Guatemala at 4,217 meters. Only 1 percent of the land is irrigated, but 12 percent is arable. The country is

divided into three basic regions: the Pacific coastal plains, the central highlands and the eastern lowlands.

| Area Population and Density | |
|-------------------------------------|-----------------------|
| Total Area | 108,890 sq kilometers |
| Coastline | 400 kilometers |
| Territorial waters claimed | 22 kilometers |
| Fishing and exclusive economic Zone | 370 kilometers |
| Population | 10,337,000 |
| Density | 95 per sq kilometers |
| Capital | Guatemala City |

Figure 16. Area, Population and Density of Guatemala (Source: Jane's Sentinel "The Unfair Advantage Regional Security Assessment Central America and the Caribbean," 1995 ed, Guatemala, 3.)

History

Guatemala was ruled by Spain from the sixteenth century until 1821 when independence was granted and the country was annexed by Mexico. In 1824 Guatemala seceded from Mexico and formed the United Provinces of Central America along with El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica. Until 1944 the country was an independent republic under military rule.

In that year, the dictatorship of General Jorge Ubrico was overthrown, and in 1945 Juan José Arevalo became the first popularly elected president of Guatemala. In 1950, he was succeeded by Jacobo Arbenz who attempted economic and social reforms and was overthrown by Castillo Armes in a coup planned and supported by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) after a massive public relations and lobbying effort by United Fruit Company who charged that there was communist influence in the Arbenz government.²

Costillo Armos ruled Guatemala from 1954 until his assassination in 1957. He was succeeded by General Migual Udigoras Fuentes who ruled for five years until overthrown by the army in 1963.

Udigoras was followed by a succession of conservative and military regimes culminating in that of General Lucas Garcia, elected in 1978, who was ousted by a coup in 1982 and replaced by a three-man military junta, led by General Efraim Rios Montt. This government had a very bad human rights record and General Montt was overthrown by his defense minister, General Oscar Humberto Mejia Victores in 1983. Elections in 1985 returned Vinicio Cerezo as the first civilian president for almost a generation and the country has enjoyed precarious civilian rule to date.³

Government

Guatemala is a unitary republic of 22 departments. Executive power is in the hands of the president who governs through a cabinet of his own selection. The legislative consist of a 61-member congress and a 14-member council of state. In practice the armed forces are the final arbiters of who will run the country, frequently intervening in politics.⁴

Defense

By law, all male citizens between the ages of 18 and 30 are liable for military service. In practice a selective draft system is employed. The duration of active service varies from one year for elements with low technical requirement to two years at the high technical requirement level. Those not inducted in the regular service must undergo reserve training every weekend during the first year and one weekend per month during the second year, a total of four weekends during the third year and two weekends during the fourth year. The armed forces total 43,900 men: 42,000 Army, 700 Air Force, and 1,200 Navy including 600 Marines. A Paramilitary force numbers 500,000 and the defense expenditure totaled \$94.64 million in 1994.

Economic Affairs

According to Jane's Sentinal, "Regional Security Assessment Central America and the Caribbean," 1995 edition, Guatemala's gross national product (GNP) in 1992 was U.S. \$10.4 million equivalent to \$1.040 per capita. The growth rate is averaging about 4 percent per annum and inflation is running at approximately 12 percent with a foreign debt of U.S. \$2.1 million.

Agriculture is the main economic occupation and the major exports are coffee, bananas, cotton, sugar, and meat. Import consists mostly of manufactured goods, textiles, wheat, and refined petroleum products although Guatemala has been a small scale exporter of crude oil since 1980. The country is almost self-sufficient in food production and with more modern and better organized farming methods could be a major food exporter. The mining of zinc, lead, antimony, and tungsten is done on a small scale. Agriculture accounts for approximately 25 percent of the GDP while manufacturing is responsible for about 18 percent.⁵

Infrastructure

There are about 2,868 kilometers of surfaced roads. The major roads and the only paved highways in the country are the Pacific Coast highways which connect Mexico City with San Salvador, and the Guatemalan section of the Pan American highway. Most other roads lack a permanent surface.

The railway routes are about 917 kilometers which are state owned and run parallel to the major highways. There also exists a small corporate network consisting of 102 kilometers which transport passengers and freight.

There are 260 kilometers of inland waterway that is navigable throughout the year while an additional 730 kilometers are available

during high water. The country's major containerization port is at Santo Tomas de Castillo. There are no natural harbors on the west coast.

Internal air transport is well developed, and eight of the 337 usable airfields have permanent all-weather runways. The primary airport is Guatemala City with a 2,987 meter runway.

Politics

The Republic of Guatemala is republican with a presidential form of government. Executive power rest with the President who serves as head of state. He is elected by universal suffrage for a four-year term and is aided by a cabinet and ministers of state nominated and dismissed by him.

The legislative power rest in a unicameral 100-member congress. Members are directly elected for four-year terms and may be re-elected only once after a lapse of one session.

The judicial system is headed by a seven-member minimum Supreme Court of Justice with the Supreme Court and appeal judges elected by Congress for four-year terms. Lower court judges are nominated by the Supreme Court.

The Guatemalan Armed Forces

The president, as commander in chief, controls the armed forces. He exercises this responsibility through the minister of defense. The chief of staff commands all the forces operationally with the exception of the presidential guard. The Supreme Council of Defense, which includes the top military commanders and the minister of defense, advises the president on matters of national security.

Operational doctrines are largely locally developed and are heavily counterinsurgency orientated on the basis of nearly 40 years of experience. Formative influences have been French, U.S., and Israeli.

In terms of strategical doctrines, these are almost entirely related to the possibility of a preemptive military strike against Belize. This envisages seizure of key points--in particular Belize's only international airport--by paratroopers and special forces and interdiction of external assistance.⁶

The disposition of the armed forces is shown at figure 32.

| | |
|-----------|--|
| Strength | 42,000 |
| Infantry | Brigade X2, Quasi Brigade X3 Battalion Group X5 Independent Battalion X19 Paratroop Battalion X2 Special Forces Group-Battalion Presidential Guard-Battalion. |
| Armor | Battalion X1 Independent Squadron X6 |
| Artillery | Field X12 Heavy Mortar X4 Anti Aircraft Battery X4 |

Figure 17. Characteristics of Guatemalan Army. (Source Jane's Sentinel, 13.)

The army is organized into two strategic reserve brigades. Each consists of three infantry battalions, a special forces platoon, an armored battalion, a field battery, a heavy mortar battery, and a logistic support unit. There are also three quasi-brigades organized on the same basis as the strategic reserve brigades less the heavy mortar battery, with five battalion groups each of a single battalion plus a special forces platoon and support element, and 19 independent infantry battalions. This totals twenty-nine infantry battalions, two paratroop battalions, one battalion of special forces, one battalion presidential guard, one armored battalion, six independent armored reconnaissance squadrons, twelve field batteries and four heavy mortar batteries, one military police battalion, one engineer battalion, one signal battalion,

one supply battalion, one ordnance battalion and a medical battalion.

The country is divided into nineteen military zones which support at least one operational and one garrison infantry battalion plus a reserve battalion, a heavy weapon support company, a service company, and a military police detachment with varying allocation of combat support units. Not all zones are, however, up to full strength. The two Guatemala City brigades are the only permanently embodied tactical formations. Tactical and operational formations are formed and disbanded in accordance with operational requirements. Only the garrison and departmental battalions are tied to the territorial organization structures. Units are otherwise freely shared between adjoining zones. Departmental battalions are primarily reserve units, with a small regular cadre.

The army equipment is shown on figure 18.

| Type | Role | Quantity |
|-----------|---------------------------|----------|
| M41 | light tank | 10 |
| M8 | armored car | 8 |
| V-150 | armored car | 7 |
| M113 | armored personnel carrier | 10 |
| armadillo | armored fighting vehicle | 25 |
| RBV-1 | scout car | 10 |

Figure 18. Inventory of the Guatamalan Army (a.) Armor. (Source: Jane's Sentinal, 16.)

| Type | Role | Quantity |
|-------------|------------------|----------|
| M18-57MM | Rocket Projector | NA |
| M40A1-100MM | Recoilless Rifle | NA |
| M65-105MM | Recoilless Rifle | NA |
| Arg-105MM | Recoilless Rifle | NA |
| Port-105MM | Recoilless Rifle | NA |
| M20-75MM | Recoilless Rifle | NA |

(b.) Anti Tank Weapons. (Source: Jane's Sentinal, 17.)

| Type | Role |
|--------------|------------------|
| Galil | Rifle |
| M16A1 | Rifle |
| M16A2 | Rifle |
| HK33 | Rifle |
| G-3 | Rifle |
| GETME | Rifle |
| FNFAL | Rifle |
| Uzi | Submachine gun |
| Madsen | Submachine gun |
| M46/53 | Submachine gun |
| Beretta | Submachine gun |
| MP42 | Submachine gun |
| MP | Submachine gun |
| MP1919 | Machine gun |
| M2HB | Machine gun |
| MG34 | Machine gun |
| M-60 | Machine gun |
| FN MAG 58 | Mortar |
| M1 81MM | Mortar |
| M19 81MM | Mortar |
| M2 60MM | Mortar |
| ECIA 60MM | Mortar |
| SOL TAM 60MM | Grenade launcher |
| M79 40MM | Grenade launcher |
| M203 40MM | Grenade launcher |

(c.) Infantry Weapons. (Source: Jane's Sentinal, Guatemala, 17.)

| Type | Role | Quantity |
|--------------|----------|----------|
| M101-105MM | Howitzer | 12 |
| M101-105MM | Howitzer | 8 |
| M56-105MM | Howitzer | 48 |
| M116-75MM | Howitzer | 8 |
| M30-4.2 inch | Howitzer | 12 |
| ECIAL-120MM | Howitzer | 8 |
| ECIASL-120MM | Howitzer | 8 |

(d.) Artillery. (Source: Jane's Sentinal, 16.)

The Air Force has a normal strength of about 700; however, this figure is misleading because it refers only to aircrew and persons directly involved in the operation of the aircraft. Taking the logistic and other support personnel the figure is more like 1,000 persons. To this could also be added two airborne battalions and four antiaircraft batteries which are under the operational control of the Air Force. When all these elements are included the strength is approximately 3,000 persons.

The Air Force is organized in two flying wings: a fixed and rotary wing and a maintenance wing. The former consist of the Quetzal Attack squadron based at San Jose, a tactical support squadron based at Santa Elena, and a transport squadron based at Guatemala City.

| | |
|---------------|-----|
| Strength | 700 |
| Fighter | N1L |
| Close Support | 17 |
| Transport | 20 |

Figure 19. Characteristics of the Guatamalan Air Force. (Source: Jane's Sentinal, 17.)

The "Ala Rotativa" consists of the sole helicopter squadron based at Guatemala City but deployed in flight elements throughout the country.

Tactical and operational doctrines are largely of U.S. origin and modified to accommodate local conditions.

| Type | Role | Quantity |
|---------------------|-----------------------------|----------|
| A37 | Light Strike | 8 |
| T37 | Trainer/light strike | 3 |
| PC7 | Trainer/light strike | 8 |
| T67 | Transport/Counterinsurgency | 3 |
| ARAVA | Transport/Counterinsurgency | 6 |
| DC6B | Transport | 1 |
| C47/AC3 | Transport | 6 |
| F27 | Transport | 3 |
| Super King Air 2000 | VIP Transport | 1 |
| Cessna 172 | Trainer | 8 |
| Cessna 170 | Liaison | 4 |
| Cessna 180 | Liaison | 3 |
| Cessna 182 | Liaison | 1 |
| Cessna 185 | Liaison | 1 |
| Cessna U206 | Liaison | 4 |
| Cessna 310 | Liaison | 1 |
| | Liaison | 1 |

Figure 20. Inventory of the Guatamalan Air Force. (a.) Fixed Wing. (Source: Jane's Sentinal, 19.)

| Type | Role | Quantity |
|--------------|-----------------|----------|
| S-76 | General purpose | 3 |
| Bell 206 | General purpose | 9 |
| Bell 212 | General purpose | 6 |
| Bell 412 | General purpose | 6 |
| Bell 4H-1D/H | General purpose | 5 |

(b.) Rotory Wing. (Source: Jane's Sentinal, 19.)

| Type | Role | Quantity |
|-----------------|------------|----------|
| M-55 rifle 20MM | Gun system | 16 |

(c.) Air Defense Systems. (Source: Jane's Sentinal, 19.)

| | |
|---------------|------|
| Strength | 1200 |
| Costal Patrol | 8 |
| River Patrol | 18 |

Figure 21. Characteristics of the Guatamalan Navy. (Source: Jane's Sentinal, 19.)

The manpower figure given is misleading as it refers only to persons engaged in specific naval tasks. Adding in two battalions of marines and logistic and support elements the figure is approximately 3,000 persons. The Navy is organized as an Atlantic and a Pacific naval squadron but has no seagoing vessels and consists of eight patrol crafts in the 30 to 100 ton range, 30 inshore and river patrol crafts, a surveying launch, two armored transport launches, three small tugs and a training yatch. The major naval shore presence are at Santo Toma's de Castillas, Puerto Barrios, Puerto Quetzal, and Sipacate. The doctrine primarily reflects U.S. and Israeli influences although the Navy was established with Swedish assistance.

| Type | Role | Quantity |
|------------|----------------------|----------|
| Broadsword | Coastal Patrol Craft | 1 |
| Sewart | Coastal Patrol Craft | 2 |
| Cutlass | Coastal Patrol Craft | 5 |
| Varios | River Patrol Craft | 18 |
| Machete | Transport launch | 2 |
| Cutlass | Surveying launch | 1 |

Figure 22. Inventory of Guatamalan Navy. (Source: Jane's Sentinal, 20.)

Paramilitary

This numbers 500,000 and was formed by conscription in an effort to combat a rural insurgency. The civil defense militias come under the command of the military commander of the military zones in which they are located. Only about 10 percent of their membership is equipped with obsolete rifles and carbines.

Belize: An Overview

Geography

Belize was known as British Honduras until 1973. It is bordered on the west and south by Guatemala which claims its entire territory, on the north by Mexico which claims a third of its territory, and on the east by the Caribbean Sea.⁷ The climate is tropical but extremes of temperature are moderated by trade winds. The rainy season is from May to November. Rainfall is more common on the coastal and hilly regions. The national language is English and the Amerindian minority speaks a variety of indigenous languages. About 62 percent of the population is Catholic.

| | |
|----------------------------|----------------------|
| Total area | 22,973 SQ kilometers |
| Coastline | 386 kilometers |
| Territorial waters claimed | 5.5 kilometers |
| Population | 229,143 |
| Density | 10 per SQ kilometers |
| Capital | Belize City |

Figure 23. Population and Density of Belize. (Source: Jane's Sentinel, 3.)

The country is generally low lying and consists largely of rain forest and swamps. The coastal region is low and swampy with the north being flat and heavily forested, punctuated with tracts of grassland. The highest peak is the Mayo Range in the southeast at a height of 1,450 meters.

History

Belize formed part of the Mayan Empire around the ninth century and was abandoned before the arrival of the first European settlers in the 16th century. From 1638 onward the area was settled by the British, however, no attempt was made to annex the territory formally. After independence in 1821 both Guatemala and Mexico claimed Belize. Little

attempt was made to enforce the claim and in 1859 Guatemala signed a treaty recognizing British sovereignty and the existing frontier. In 1862 Britain annexed Belize as a crown colony. In 1864 Belize became an independent British colony and in 1964 full self-government was attained. Finally, in 1981 Belize became an independent member state of the British Commonwealth.

The Treaty of 1859 signed between Britain and Guatemala was never formally ratified. The treaty was therefore never recognized by subsequent Guatemalan governments, almost all of whom have renewed their claim on Belize. Diplomatic relations between Britain and Guatemala were broken off in 1962 because of Guatemala's territorial claim on Belize. However, most Latin American governments do recognize the independence of Belize.

In 1981 seven nations including Britain and Canada pledged to consult one another on actions to be taken if Belize was attacked. Britain had maintained a 1,600 strong military garrison since 1975 until it was withdrawn in 1994⁸ and reduced to a 200-man strong jungle warfare training unit. In October 1993 Belizean Prime Minister Manuel Esquivel, during a visit to Britain, expressed his concern at continued instability in Guatemala and the threat it posed and sought further assurances of military support from Britain. In light of the British withdrawal the Belizean armed forces were increased with the aim of reaching 3,000 strength.⁹

Government

The crown as head of state is represented by a governor general and commander in chief. There is a bicameral legislature. Executive power is in the hands of the prime minister and cabinet who are elected from the legislature. The constitution calls for a five-year term

National Assembly consisting of a twenty-eight-member House of Representatives and an eight-member Senate.

Defense

The bulk of Belizian defense was until 1994 provided by Britain which maintained a permanent garrison of some 1,200 troops, artillery, a flight of four RAF Harrier aircrafts, four Puma helicopters, four Gazelle helicopters, and four units of Rapier Surface to air missiles (SAMs). In times of threat from Guatemala this was reinforced by sea and air units from Britain. Since 1994 a 200-man jungle warfare training center has been maintained by the British.

Because of the withdrawal of the British, the Belizean Defense Force was increased and the strength is approximately 700 with a target of 3,000 men and women. This is a triservice force and consists mainly of ground elements with an infantry battalion reserve. Recruitment is voluntary and the force reflects the influence of both Britain and the United States in its operational doctrines. Defense expenditure was about U.S. \$22 million in 1994.¹⁰

Economic Affairs

According to Jane's Sentinal, "Regional Security Assessment Central America and the Caribbean," 1995 edition, Belize GDP in 1993 was U.S. \$497.1 million, the equivalent of \$2,440 per capita. The growth rate is averaging about 6 percent per annum and inflation is running at approximately 5.5 percent.

Belize is dependent on agribusiness which accounts for approximately 70 percent of total foreign exchange earnings and 30 percent of GDP. Industrial production accounts for only 16 percent of GDP but is growing at about 10 percent annually. The country is not self-ufficient in food production and relies on import mainly from the U.S. to cover the deficiency. Small deposits of petroleum were

discovered in the north but to date these have not been worthy of commercial exploitation. However, it is believed that large deposits of petroleum exist in the south and this is the cause for Guatemala's continued claim on Belize.

Infrastructure

There are four major highways and the major roads are connected by roadways of which 320 kilometers are paved. There is no railway system or navigable inland waterways. Belize has 30 usable airfields of which four have permanent surface runways. Belize City has a modern deep-water port capable of handling containerized shipping.

Politics

Belize is an independent member of the commonwealth with a parliamentary system of government and recognition of the British monarch, who is locally represented by the governor general as a ceremonial head of state. Executive power actually rests with the prime minister who appoints the cabinet and has the power to dissolve the parliament and call for new elections. The legislative power rests in a bicameral national assembly where the members serve five-year terms. The eight-member senate is appointed by the governor general: five members on the suggestion of the prime minister, two on advice of the opposition leader and one after consultation with the Belize Advisory Council. The 18-member House of Representatives is directly elected. The judicial system is based on English common law and the constitution. The governor general appoints the chief justice of the Supreme Court after consultation with the prime minister and the opposition leader. The British Privy Council hears final appeals, and there is no judicial review of legislative acts.¹¹

The Belizean Armed Forces

The commander of the army reports to the governor general as the commander in chief via the prime minister who is also the minister of defense. The army is a brigade size tri-service force and operational doctrine is based on Britain and the U.S., weighing heavily on the former. In terms of strategy doctrines are primarily based on the maintenance of the country's precarious independence against external threat from Guatemala and to a lesser extent from Mexico. The disposition of the armed forces is shown at figure 33.

| | |
|-----------|-------------|
| Strength | 600 |
| Infantry | 1 battalion |
| Armor | nil |
| Artillery | nil |

Figure 24. Characteristics of Belizean Army. (Source: Jane's Sentinel, 9.)

The main military base is at Price Barracks, 10 kilometers from Belize City where all training takes place. There is also a ground forces base at Belizario Camp near San Ignacio on the border with Guatemala currently garrisoned by a rifle company. Of the three reserve companies one is based at Corozal in the north, one in Belize City, and the third in Stenn Creek in the south. The defense of the country by the Belize Defense Force against external threat is severely restricted because of the lack of armor and antiarmor capabilities.

| Type | Role |
|---------------|-----------------|
| LIAI SLR | Rifle |
| Sterling L2A3 | Sub machine-gun |
| Bren L1A1 | Machine-gun |
| GPMG L7 | Machine-gun |
| L16 | 81 MM mortar |

Figure 25. Inventory of the Belizean Army. (Source: Jane's Sentinel, 9.)

| | |
|---------------|-------------|
| Strength | 50 |
| Fighter | nil |
| Close Support | nil |
| Transport | 3 (2 armed) |

Figure 26. Characteristics of the Belizean Air Wing. (Source: Jane's Sentinel, 9.)

The air wing of the Belizean Defense Force is about 50 strong and is equipped with two armed Pilatus/Britten-Norman BN2B Defender general-purpose aircraft and a single Pilatus/Britten-Norman BN2A Islander utility transport. The role of the air wing is the tactical and logistic support of the land and sea elements of the Belizean Defense Force. All aircraft are based at Belize City, and there are airfields at Belmopan and Punta Gorda which can serve as refueling points. There are also more than 30 usable airstrips throughout the country.

Tactical and operational doctrines are mainly British with U.S. influence.

| Type | role | Quantity |
|------------------------------------|-------------------------------|----------|
| Pilatus-Britten Norman Defender | Transport/tactical Support | 2 |
| Pilatus-Britten Norman Defender | Transport | 1 |

Figure 27. Inventory of the Belizean Air Wing. (Source: Jane's Sentinel, 10.)

| | |
|----------------------|----|
| Strength | 50 |
| Coastal Patrol Craft | 2 |
| Inshore Patrol Craft | 4 |

Figure 28. Characteristics of the Belizean Coast Guard. (Source: Jane's Sentinal, 10.)

The maritime wing of the Belize Defense Force numbers about 50 and operates two 20-meter coastal patrol vessels and four inshore coastal patrol crafts. It is responsible for policing the territorial waters of the state and the country's exclusive economic zone. The marine element is based at Punta Gorda. Operational and tactical doctrine is mainly British with some U.S. influence.

| Type | Role | Quantity |
|------|----------------------|----------|
| Wasp | Coastal Patrol Craft | 2 |
| | Inshore Patrol Craft | 4 |

Figure 29. Inventory of the Belizean Coast Guard. (Source: Jane's Sentinal, 10.)

Assessment

The British presence in Belize has been a valuable deterrent to Guatemalan expansionism which on several occasions has provided a real threat to the independence of Belize. Although recent Guatemalan administrations have appeared conciliatory on their claims to Belize, the situation is still fragile. With the history of coups in Guatemala, all it takes is a coup with a proexpansionist administration to invade Belize. With the withdrawal of the British in 1994 and the limited defense capability of the Belize Defense Force, Guatemala could successfully invade Belize if planned, quick assistance is not readily available.

The main avenue of approach into Belize is the main road running along the Belmopan and Belize City axis. This is the only viable high-speed armor approach and the vital bridge across the Belize River is located here. If blown this bridge could delay such an advance. Belize airport, the country's sole runway capable of handling a rapid buildup of troops, is also located here. Punta Gorda, in the south which is the center of oil and mineral exploration, is the next approach. This is the region that the British were willing to cede to Guatemala. This port is within easy reach of Puerto Barrios, Guatemala's sole Caribbean port where the majority of Guatemala's navy is located. The long eastern and southern border through the Maya Mountains provide good infiltration routes for infantry. Once Punta Gorda is secured, this opens up the coastal roads for armor penetration. The third approach is in the north around the Orange Walk area. This is not a good armor approach and would see mainly dismounted infantry. These approaches are shown at figure 31.¹²

An invasion by Guatemala could see two options. The first could see the Guatemalan armed forces seizing the area in the south which includes the Punta Gorda region that is suspected to be rich in oil deposits and then advancing northwards along the coast. Supporting attacks would also be launched along the Belmopan and Belize City axis and the Orange Walk axis. The second option could be launching the main armor attack along the Belmopan and Belize City axis to seize the Belize airport where reinforcements could be landed. There would also be supporting attacks along the northern and southern approaches to seize the Punta Gorda and the Orange Walk regions and the Navy blockading the port at Punta Gorda. The option that best supports the objectives of Guatemala is option two where the armed forces could quickly overrun the small, under-equipped Belizean army, seize the Belize airport, and land reinforcements to secure Belize City which is the nerve center of

Belize. At the same time supporting attacks could secure the suspected oil rich Punta Gorda region and the Orange Walk region. This option would destroy the Belize center of gravity and at the same time secure the Punta Gorda region.

A Hypothetical Attack by Guatemala on Belize

A large deposit of oil was found in the Punta Gorda region and on D-60¹³ there is a military coup in Guatemala. The new military junta renewed its claim on Belize, and it is believed that the recent discovery of oil is the reason. On D-50 the military junta started to build up forces along the border with Belize placing emphasis on the three main approaches into Belize shown on the map at figure 31.

The Belize government requested help through the Caribbean Defense Board to the multinational alliance authority.¹⁴ On D-45 the multinational alliance authority met and issued a statement that the Guatemalan government should immediately withdraw its forces from the Guatemala/Belize border by D-30 or else action would be taken to maintain the sovereignty of Belize. At the same time the Belize Defense Force deployed its forces along the three approaches to delay the possible invasion.

On D-40 the Caribbean Commonwealth Regional Defense Force is activated.¹⁵ Panama is selected as the intermediate staging area and the force begins deployment to Panama. The MEU (SOC) is also dispatched to the Caribbean Sea off the shores of Belize.

On D-30 instead of withdrawing its forces Guatemala continued the military buildup, concentrating mainly in the Belmopan/Belize City approach. The MEU(SOC) is then deployed to protect Belize City and Punta Gorda regions along with the Belize Defense Force. However, the Guatemalan armed forces buildup continues.

On D-Day Guatemalan forces cross the border and the MEU(SOC) and the Belize Defense Force start delaying action.

On D+1 the Air Force commences offensive action to delay and attrit Guatemalan forces. The CDF battalion is moved by helicopter from Panama into the northern region to stop the advance of the Guatemalan Army. A light battalion and a U.S. armored battalion is moved by the Air Force into the Belize City airport and deploys to stop the advance of Guatemalan forces in the Belmopen and Belize City axis. In the south a U.S. light battalion is moved by helicopter to stop the advance of Guatemalan forces along the southern approach. Shown at annex I is the deployment map. Refueling of the helicopters from Panama is done in Honduras where the U.S. maintains bases.

At D+10 the advance of Guatemalan forces is stopped and offensive action begins with the CDF in the north, the U.S. armored and light battalions in the center, and the U.S. light battalion in the south. The MEU(SOC) and the Belize Defense Force, which suffered casualties in the delaying action, are in reserve.

At D+20 Guatemalan forces withdraw under pressure to the original border and the Commonwealth Regional Defense Force is in defense along the border. Postconflict operation commences and SOF is used to train the Belize Defense Force. Covert action is also taken to overthrow the military junta. On D+50 the military junta is overthrown and a peaceful settlement is negotiated between Belize and Guatemala's new government. The Commonwealth Regional Force is withdrawn and returned to their home countries.

Endnotes

¹"The Unfair Advantage Regional Security Assessment Central America and the Caribbean," Jane's Sentinel. 1995 ed, ed by Adrian, English-Guatemala, 3.

²Defense and Foreign Affairs Handbook, Publisher Pamela von Gruber, Editor-in-Chief, Gregory R. Copley. (London: International Media Corp., 1994), 472.

³"The Unfair Advantage Regional Security Assessment Central America and the Caribbean," Jane's Sentinel, 1995 ed, ed by Adrian, English-Guatemala, 5.

⁴Ibid., 6.

⁵Ibid., 24.

⁶Ibid., 11.

⁷Ibid., 3.

⁸Ibid., 11.

⁹Defense and Foreign Affairs Handbook, ed. Gregory R. Copley (London: Pamela von Gruber, 1994), 112.

¹⁰Ibid., 113.

¹¹Ibid., 112.

¹²MAJ Neil C. Lewis, "Combined Operations: A Commonwealth Perspective." (Master of Military Art and Science thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1988), 105-113.

¹³D-Day is the day that operations commences.

¹⁴The strategic command structure is shown in Chapter 5, 32. This outlines the chain of command.

¹⁵Ibid., 33-40.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

The history of the Commonwealth Caribbean is closely linked with the socioeconomic problems that face the region today. The days of the slave trade created a society that had the rich absentee landowner, the overseers, and the slaves which created a stratified society. Traces of this structure is still evident today where the land is not evenly distributed and this is a cause for concern. The different races with diverse cultures that were brought to the region as laborers is also a cause for tension and in some of the countries, e.g., Guyana, this has affected its stability. The Parliamentary system of government that the region inherited from the British has also caused problems because the prime minister has immense powers given to him by the constitution, and there are no effective checks and balances to limit his power. This has led to abuse in the past and is an area of concern, which could trigger problems. The drug trade is now the biggest cause for concern and the events in Colombia has proven that these drug cartels with the wealth that they possess could overthrow the small fragile governments of the region. Lastly, there is a real external threat to countries like Belize because of border disputes that have not been settled.

The armies of the region are very small and not equipped to deal with the threats that they face. They are basically equipped and staffed to deal with internal security problems. Therefore, the region needs assistance to deal with the threat, and the U.S. which has security and economic interests in the region could provide this support.

The form of support is developing a Regional Defense Force that would be a deterrent and also be capable of taking military action if the situation warranted it. The funding for development of this force must be borne by the U.S. and the Commonwealth Caribbean countries on a proportionate basis. The cost will not be ponderous because the force will come together annually only for exercise purposes and when there is an emergency. The only permanent structure will be a small headquarters based with Atlantic Command that will oversee the day-to-day administration of the force inclusive of planning the annual exercise. The different countries already have standing armed forces. Therefore, only the additional equipment needed will have to be funded and funding will be done on a phased basis in the long run.

This force will pay dividends in the future as a deterrent, and it is in keeping with the U.S. National Security Strategy of engagement and enlargement. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General John M. Shalikashvili, in the National Military Strategy of the USA stated that "under this national strategy we will enhance our security by maintaining a strong defense capability, promoting cooperative security measures, working to open foreign markets and spur global economic growth, and promoting democracy abroad."¹ This supports forming the Caribbean Defense Force because it will promote democracy, promote cooperative security measures, and spur global economic growth. The cost of implementation will also be minimal because the armed forces already exist.

The structure of the force must be one that can be deployed quickly and easily and have the capability of establishing beachheads because all countries of the region are either completely or partially surrounded by water. This favors light forces with an amphibious element as shown in chapter 4, figure 8.

Endnote

¹Department of Defense, A Strategy of Flexible and Selective Engagement, (Washington, DC., GPO, 1995), editorial page.

GLOSSARY

Regimental Sergeant Major (RSM). This is the senior enlisted soldier in the Battalion. He is a member of the Battalion Commander special staff who is an advisor on matters to do with the enlisted soldiers. He is the equivalent of a E-7 and in the Caribbean rank structure which is similar to the British is called a warrant officer class I.

Regimental Quarter Master Sergeant (RQMS). He is the equivalent of a E-7 in the headquarters company and is responsible to the quarter master (QM) (Officer in charge of logistics) for procurement and distribution of stores. He is also a warrant officer class I. This structure is similar to the British rank structure.

Chief Clerk (CC). He is the equivalent of a E-7 in the battalion headquarters responsible for documentation. He works for the battalion commander and is supervised by the Personnel Staff Officer (S-1) (Adjutant).

Master Cook (M/Cook). He is the senior enlisted who is in charge of preparing meals. He is a E-6 and is in Headquarters Company.

Motor Transport Officer (MTO). He is the equivalent of a O-3 and is responsible for all transportation in the battalion. He works for the Headquarters Company Commander.




Figure 30. Central America and the Caribbean. Reprinted by permission from Neil C. Lewis (MAJ JDF) "Combined Operations a Commonwealth Perspective" (Master of Military Arts and Science thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1988) 161.




Figure 31. Belize Guatemala Threat Map. (Reprinted by permission from Neil C. Lewis (MAJ JDF) "Combined Operations a Commonwealth Perspective" (Master of Military Srts and Science thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1988), 171.




Figure 32. Disposition Guatemala Armed Forces. (Reprinted by permission from Jane's Sentinel, Guatemala, 1).




Figure 33. Disposition Belize Armed Forces. (Reprinted by permission from Jane's Sentinel, Belize 1).




Figure 34. Deployment Caribbean Defense Force. (Reprinted, by permission, from Martin Greenweld Associates, Inc. Central American (Modified) 1981.)

ANNEX A

Geo/Demo-graphics

| | Population | | | Life Expec | Area 1000 | Political System |
|------------------------|-------------------|------------------|-------|---------------|--------------|---------------------------------|
| | Total Millions | Growth Rate % | | | | |
| Belize | .2140 | 2.42 | 68.32 | | | Westminister Style Monarchy (1) |
| Cayman Islands | .0332 | 4.3 | 77.1 | 100 | | Democratic Crown Colony (2) |
| Jamaica | 2.574 | .78 | 74.65 | 4411 | | Westminister Style Ltd Monarchy |
| Bermuda | .0616 | .76 | 75.03 | 21 | | Democratic Crown Colony |
| Bahamas | .2566 | 1.09 | 72.12 | 5000 | | Westminister Style Ltd Monarchy |
| Turks & Caicos | .0140 | 2.41 | 75.37 | 112 | | Autocratic Crown Colony |
| British Virgin Islands | .0130 | 1.27 | 72.73 | 59 | | Democratic Crown Colony |
| Anguilla | .0070 | .66 | 74.10 | 35 | | Democratic Crown Colony |
| St. Kitts/Nevis | .0410 | .85 | 66.51 | 101 | | Westminister Style Ltd Monarchy |
| Antigua & Barbuda | .0651 | .68 | 73.40 | 171 | | Westminister Style Ltd Monarchy |
| Montserrat | .0127 | .30 | 75.68 | 39 | | Democratic Crown Colony |
| Dominica | .0826 | .40 | 77.20 | 290 | | Westminister Style Presidency |
| St. Lucia | .1560 | 1.17 | 69.88 | 238 | | Westminister Style Ltd Monarchy |
| St. Vincent & Gren | .1173 | .65 | 72.66 | 150 | | Westminister Style Ltd Monarchy |
| Grenada | .0944 | .45 | 70.67 | 133 | | Westminister Style Ltd Monarchy |
| Trinidad & Tobago | 1.271 | .12 | 70.14 | 1719 | | Westminister Style Presidency |
| Barbados | .2563 | .24 | 74.16 | 166 | | Westminister Style Ltd Monarchy |
| Guyana | .7237 | -0.81 | 65.1 | 83000 | | Westminister Style Ltd Monarchy |

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1. In this form of government HM Queen Elizabeth the Second is Head of State. On the recommendation of the Prime Minister she appoints a local as Governor General and her representative. The parliament generally comprises an elected lower House of Representatives and a appointed Upper House. The executive is formed from the Parliament and operates through a professional Civil Service.

2. In this form there may or may not be a representative legislature. The Governor is appointed by the sovereign and presides over the government. Britain generally retain responsibility for foreign affairs and defense.

3. Source: Jane's Sentinel.

ANNEX B

ECONOMIC STATISTICS

| | GDP BILLIONS | DEBT BILLIONS | BILLIONS | GROWTH RATE %/ANN | INFLATION % | UNEMPLOY MENT % | ECONOMIC BASE |
|-------------------|-----------------|------------------|----------|-------------------------|----------------|--------------------|------------------------|
| Belize | .575 | .0158 | -.166 | 2.0 | 5.5 | 10.0 | Agriculture |
| Jamaica | 7.8 | 3.6 | -1.000 | 2.0 | 26.7 | 15.7 | Tourism/Alumina/Agri |
| Bahamas | 4.4 | .455 | .893 | 3.5 | 2.7 | 13.1 | Tourism/Financial Svcs |
| Eastern Caribbean | .500 | - | - | .78 | - | | Tourism/Agriculture |
| Barbados | 2.40 | .652 | -.542 | 3.0 | 2.0 | 23.0 | Tourism/Sugar/Oil |
| Trinidad & Tobago | 15.00 | 2.0 | +.964 | 3.0 | 10.1 | 18.5 | Oil/Sugar |
| Guyana | 1.40 | 2.2 | +.0019 | 8.5 | 15.5 | 15.0 | Alumna/Agriculture |

(Source: Jane's Sentinel.)

ANNEX C

MILITARY STATISTICS

| Strength 1000s | Def | FMA Budget \$Million | Population 1000s | | | |
|-------------------|---------|----------------------------|-------------------|--------------|----------------|---|
| | | | \$Million | Men 18-30 | Women 18-30 | Men 31-45 |
| Regular | Reserve | Total | | | | |
| 610 | 300 | 910 | .050 | 17.3 | 17.5 | 6.2 |
| Belize | | | | | | British Presence |
| 2100 | 745 | 2845 | 1.1 | 299.0 | 300.0 | 124.0 |
| Jamaica | | | | | | Professional Mil |
| 496 | - | 496 | .70 | 25.2 | 27.5 | 20.5 |
| Bahamas | | | | | | Coast Guard Only |
| 391 | - | 391 | .60 | - | - | Members OECS ² /RSS ¹ |
| Eastern Caribbean | | | | | | |
| 543 | - | 543 | NA ⁽⁴⁾ | - | - | Member RSS |
| Barbados | | | | | | |
| 2130 | - | 2130 | .01 | 151.0 | 155.0 | 98.0 |
| Trinidad | | | | | | Professional Mil |
| 5425 | 3000 | 8425 | 1.20 | 116.0 | 115.0 | 63.0 |
| Guyana | | | | | | Military/Police |

(1) Regional Security System (RSS). Grouping of 7 Eastern Caribbean countries (Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts and Navis, St. Lucia and St. Vincent and the Grenadines) organized for defense and security of the region.

(2) Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS). Grouping of Eastern Caribbean States of Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts and Navis, St. Lucia and St. Vincent and the Grenadines.

(3) Contribution to Central RSS Funds only. National Security figures not available.

(4) FMA for Barbados figures in with the Eastern Caribbean as part of the RSS.

(5) Source: Jane's Sentinel.

ANNEX D

DATA ON ARMED FORCES OF THE COMMONWEALTH CARIBBEAN

| | | BELIZE | JAMICA |
|----|------------------|-------------------------|---|
| 1. | General | | |
| | GDP | US .575 BN | 7.8 BN |
| | Def Budget | US 11.0 M | 19.3 M |
| | Sec Assist | US 1.0 M | 7.7 M |
| | Strength Active | 610 | 2100 |
| | Reserve | 300 | 745 |
| | Terms of Service | Volunteer | Volunteer |
| 2. | ARMY | | |
| | Headquarters | 1xMain (Bde) | 1xMain (Bde) |
| | Armor Units | None | 2xRecce Coys |
| | Armor Equip | None | 15 AFUs |
| | Infantry Units | 1 Inf Bn (1 Reserve) | 3 Inf Bns |
| | Infantry Equip | Trucks | Trucks |
| | Artillery Units | None | None |
| | Artillery Equip | 6 mor 81 mm | 12 Mor 81mm |
| | Sustainment Base | Small | 1 Spt Bn, 1 Engr Bn (Med, Supply) |
| 3. | NAVY/CG | | |
| | Platforms | 2xPatrol 20M | 5 Patrol (80-140ft) and various small inshore patrol craft |
| | Weapons | MHG's | HMG's |
| | Marines | None | None |

4. AIRFORCE

| | | |
|-----------------------|---------------------|---|
| Units | 1 FLT | 1 Sqn |
| Fighter | None | None |
| Transport | 2 (BN2 Islander) | 7 (BN2 (Islander King Air Cessna 210) |
| Attack Helicopters | None | None |
| Transport Helicopters | None | 10 (Bell 212, 206, 205) |

5. TRAINING

| | | |
|-------------|-------|--------------------------|
| Officers | UK | UK, Canada, India, US |
| Other Ranks | Local | UK, Canada Local |

| | | BAHAMAS | RSS (1) | TRINIDAD |
|----|-----------------------|------------------------|--------------------------------|--|
| 1. | GENERAL | | | |
| | GDP | US 4.4 BN | 2.9 BN | 15.0 BN |
| | Def Budget | US 65.0 M | 19.0 M | 83.0 M |
| | Sec Assist | .05 M | 10.0 M | .05 M |
| | Strength Active | 496 | 610 | 2100 |
| | Reserve | - | 300 | 745 |
| | Terms of Service | Volunteer | Volunteer | Volunteer |
| 2. | ARMY | | | |
| | Headquarters | None | 1xMain | 1xMain |
| | Armor Units | - | None | None |
| | Armor Equip | - | None | None |
| | Infantry Units | - | 1 Cd Coy 30-70 man SSIs) | 2 Inf Bn (1 reserve) |
| | Infantry Equip | - | - | Trucks |
| | Artillery Units | - | - | - |
| | Artillery Equip | - | - | - |
| | Sustainment Base | - | Small | 1 Spt Bn (Engrs Med, Supply etc) |
| 3. | NAVY/CG | | | |
| | Platforms | 16 Patrol 20-103 ft | 20 Patrol (27-123 ft) | 18 Patrol (55-133 ft) |
| | Weapons | HMGs | MHGs | HMGs |
| | Marines | (15-20) | None | None |
| 4. | AIRFORCE | | | |
| | Units | - | - | 1 Flt |
| | Fighter | - | - | None |
| | Transport | - | 2 (Cessna 402,210) | |
| | Attack Helicopters | - | None | |
| | Transport Helicopters | - | - | 4 (gazelle & 576 SAR) |

5. TRAINING

| | | | | |
|----|-------------|-------|-----------------------------|-------------|
| US | Officers | UK | UK, US | US, Canada, |
| UK | Other Ranks | Local | Local (US & UK Trg Teams | Local, US, |

(1) Barbados and Eastern Caribbean States form the RSS.

| | | |
|-----------------------|------|-------------------------------------|
| | | GUYANA |
| 1. General | | |
| GDP | US | 1.4 BN |
| Def Budget | US | 65.0 M |
| Sec Assist | US | .05 M |
| Strength Active | | 5425 |
| Reserve | | 3000 |
| Terms of Service | | Volunteer |
| 2. ARMY | | |
| Headquarters | | 1 Main (Div) 1 Bde |
| Armor Units | | 1 RECCCE PL |
| Armor Equip | | 4 X AFVs |
| Infantry Units | | 3 Inv, 1 Sp Bn 1 Sp Wpn Bn |
| Infantry Equip | | Trucks |
| Artillery Units | | 1 Bn |
| Artillery Equip | | How 130 mm Mor 81, 82 120 mm |
| Sustainment Base | | Engr Coy (Inf Bns Self-contained |
| 3. NAVY/CG | | |
| Platforms | | 14 Patrol (Vosper and N Korean |
| Weapons | | unknown |
| Marines | | None |
| 4. AIRFORCE | | |
| Units | | 1 Sqn |
| Fighter | | None |
| Transport | | 12 (DHC6, BN2 Short Skyvan |
| Attack Helicopters | None | |
| Transport Helicopters | | 8 Bell 206, 212, 412, M18 |

5. TRAINING

Officers

UK, Canada

Other Ranks

Local

(Source: Jane's Sentinal.)

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